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Abstract—The paper presents an application of an RT-family
trust management language as a basis for an access control
model. The discussion concerns a secure workstation running
multiple virtual machines used to process sensitive informa-
tion from multiple security domains, providing strict separa-
tion of the domains. The users may act in several different
roles, with different access rights. The inference mechanisms
of the language are used to translate credentials allowing users
to access different functional domains, and assigning virtual
machines to these domains into clear rules, regulating the
rights of a particular user to a particular machine, taking
into account different periods of validity of different creden-
tials. The paper also describes a prototype implementation of
the model.
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1. Introduction
The article presents issues related to granting secure user
access to resources having diﬀerent sensitivity levels. This
subject is one of the most important aspects of the project
called “Special workstation for special applications”. The
project is focused on building a secure system to work
with documents from diﬀerent security domains located
in virtual environment. Separation of system resources
(e.g., Processors, RAM Memory, etc.) between virtual ma-
chines is not part of presented security model and it will
not be described in this article. However, it was included
in the architecture of the prototype solution.
The rest of this section presents a short description of the
“Secure workstation for special application” project and the
RT-family trust management languages, one of which is
used to describe the proposed model. Section 2 focuses on
presentation of the most important functional requirements.
The proposed security model is presented in Sections 3, 4,
and 5. Section 6 describes the implemented prototype. The
article concludes with a short summary in Section 7.
1.1. Secure Workstation for Special Application
The work presented in this paper is a part of the project
called “Secure workstation for special applications” [1],
which aim is to create a secure environment for process-
ing of sensitive information based on virtualization tech-
nology. The documents belonging to diﬀerent security do-
mains (diﬀerent sensitivity levels or functional domains)
are processed in separate, isolated, virtual machines run-
ning special secure versions of guest systems. The expected
result of the project, to be delivered later this year, is an
advanced technology demonstrator. The products of the
project will include:
– secure system platform, referenced as SSP – software
component integrating a secure host operating system
and virtual machine management tools, which is able
to run several instances of guest operating system;
– special versions of guest operating systems – secure
version of Linux and Windows systems prepared to
run under control of the secure system platform;
– technical and operational documentation of the sys-
tem, recommendations, procedures and templates;
– examples of cryptographic data protection and au-
thentication mechanisms, e.g. biometrics.
The project consortium is led by the Military University of
Technology in Warsaw and consists of Filbico Sp. zo.o.,
Military Telecommunications Institute and Research and
Academic Computer Network (NASK).
1.2. RT-Family Trust Management Language
Role-based trust management (RT) languages were intro-
duced in [2] and combine features of trust management [3]
and Role Based Access Control [4]. They are used for
representing security policies and credentials in centralized
and distributed access control systems. A credential pro-
vides information about the user access privileges and the
security policies issued by one or more trusted authorities.
So far the family consists of: RT0, RT1, RT2, RT T , RT D
languages [2], [5]–[7] which are progressively increasing
in expressive power and complexity. For language RT T
which is backwards compatible with RT0, RT1 and RT2,
in [8] time validity of credentials is proposed. The ex-
tended versions of these languages are referenced as RT T+ ,
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RT2+, RT1+, and RT0+. In [9] the general structure of
proofs of soundness and completeness of inference systems
for these languages are presented. The complete proof is
still waiting for publication.
While legal regulations enforce only using mandatory ac-
cess control (MAC [10], [11]), the proposed model of user
access control to virtual machines will be based on a trust
management language from the RT family with time va-
lidity, enabling more detailed speciﬁcation of access rules.
Language RT2+ ﬁts our expectations by supporting param-
eterized roles and deﬁning o-sets which are able to group
objects representing resources in much the same way as
roles group subjects. This enables completely abstract poli-
cies to be created where permissions are speciﬁed in terms
of roles, and o-sets and actual relations between subjects
and objects are established by assigning them to roles and
o-sets.
2. Security Model – Requirements
The basic requirement for the deﬁned model of access con-
trol to virtual machines is its validity. Additionally it has
to comply with functional requirements of the project. The
most important ones are described in this section.
2.1. Security Clauses
The security model must support various levels of security
which are assigned to system users and documents located
Fig. 1. Relations between security levels in Poland, European
Union and NATO.
on virtual machines. Figure 1 shows a diagram of rela-
tions between security levels in Poland, European Union
and NATO.
2.2. Protected Resources
Protected resources, e.g., documents, are located inside vir-
tual systems. The security model for user access to virtual
machines presumes that all protected resources are located
on virtual machines. A permission is granted to access
a particular virtual machine which holds documents with
the same sensitivity level. A user in the system can have
access to many virtual machines, as well as one virtual
machine can be accessed by many users.
2.3. Functional Domains
The security model has to support various functional do-
mains. Domain partitioning allows for more elastic man-
agement of system resources and user permissions. Ex-
amples of security domains might include: ﬁnance – this
domain holds information related to payrolls, incomes of
employees, etc., or projects – the domain holds information
about running projects.
Additionally, the security model should support separation
of resources located in the same functional domain but with
diﬀerent sensitivity levels. Security domain can hold re-
sources with diﬀerent sensitivity levels assigned to them,
but a user can only access those with sensitivity level not
exceeding his clearance.
2.4. Users of the SSP System
The security model has to diﬀerentiate users based on
the potential system utilization by them. A basic system
user can only use resources which he is allowed to ac-
cess. From the system security point of view, the people
responsible for granting other users rights to use the sys-
tem are the most important group. Additionally, due to the
accountability requirement for the secure workstation, it
is required to include users responsible for auditing the
system.
2.5. Time Validity
The security model should include information about va-
lidity period of the issued credentials. Implementing time
frames of validity for granted permissions is necessary in
the system. Security clearance and certiﬁcates of received
trainings considering data protection are valid only for spec-
iﬁed periods of time. The procedures for assigning access
rights to protected resources for a user need to enforce
a deﬁnition of their validity period, so that the model will
be similar to a real system.
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3. Security Model – Subjects
and Objects
Security model is based on two types of entities – a se-
cure workstation and system users – and the same number
of objects corresponding to the resources of the system –
virtual machines and shared storage areas.
Secure workstation is a central point of authority. Only
roles and sets deﬁned by the Secure Workstation and cre-
dentials issued by it are supported by the deductive system.
The most important attribute of an entity is a unique iden-
tifier that is referenced as B later in the article.
System User is a key entity. Based on issued credentials,
protected system resources are made available to it. User
entity possesses a number of attributes that are derived from
requirements for security model:
– Unique identifier – referenced as uid – used to diﬀer-
entiate between users;
– Security levels – referenced as ulev – contains a list
of all sensitivity levels which the user has access to.
Additionally each clause has a deﬁned time period of its
validity. The validity depends on the clearance held by the
user, e.g., in Polish law validity is determined by owned se-
curity credentials and completed trainings on protection of
classiﬁed information. The time period of certiﬁcate valid-
ity is referenced as vl , where l corresponds to the identiﬁer
of security level.
Virtual machine and shared storage area. All resources
of the secure workstation to which access is determined
by the deﬁned model are contained in the described ob-
jects. The main purpose of virtual machines is to allow for
working with documents of diﬀerent security level. Shared
storage areas provide access to resources that are located
directly on the secure workstation. They enable diﬀerent
access to be assigned to directories or hard drives for dif-
ferent users. In particular, a separate hard drive destined
for collecting logs is intended and available only for the
safety auditor. The most important attributes of an object
are:
– Unique identifier – referenced as mvid and ssid – used
to diﬀerentiate between objects.
– Validation period – referenced as vmv and vss – period
of time when particular object is available for systems
users.
– Security level – referenced as mvlev and sslev – at-
tribute speciﬁes security level of all resources con-
tained in a particular object.
4. Security Model – Roles and O-Sets
The RT1 is an extention of RT0 and introduces parameter-
ized roles, while the RT2 language extends RT1 with o-sets.
In the following section all roles and o-sets used by the
access control model are described.
4.1. Parameters
All deﬁned roles for grouping subjects, and also all object
sets can depend only on the following parameters:
User role parameter – referenced as rol – has a slightly
diﬀerent meaning depending on the context where it is used,
either referencing security model roles or o-sets. In case of
security model roles, it deﬁnes a role for the system user.
Second case is when it describes a user’s role necessary
to access protected resources (either a virtual machine or
shared storage area). The parameter can be assigned the
following values:
– USER – references users with basic rights in the sys-
tem which can get access only to resources assigned
to them;
– SPEC – references Chief Information Security Of-
ﬁcer (security specialist) with function of granting
users access rights to resources, but does not have an
access to these resources himself. This is the only
role which can add new credentials interpreted by the
system. In fact, a user with this role can be viewed
as the host system’s administrator;
– AUDIT – references Chief Audit Executive (security
auditor) whose role is assuring system accountability
by validating system event log ﬁles;
– ADMIN – additional role for virtual machine admin-
istrators responsible for the conﬁguration of virtual
machines.
Functional domain parameter – referenced as dom – cor-
responds to system partitioning into separate domains al-
lowing an easy management of users and resources. A user
gains access to resources by acquiring proper credentials to
access a domain. A particular resource is accessible only
if it is assigned to a domain. The parameter does not have
a deﬁned set of allowed values. The only restriction is
a unique identiﬁer of a newly added domain.
Type of access parameter – referenced as rig – the security
model provides means to determine the access type granted
for a user to a resource. Two basic types of access rights are
distinguished: a right to read referenced as R and a right to
read and write referenced as RW. The ﬁrst type is applicable
in case of shared storage areas containing log ﬁles of system
events. A system administrator should have an access to it,
but should not have a right to modify it. An auditor has the
ability to create a backup of secured data and delete the old
one by using an additional software. In case of resources
on virtual machines, only the second type of access rights
is used.
Security level parameter – referenced as lev – The secu-
rity model requires specifying a sensitivity level for each
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resource. The resource may not be accessed by users with-
out a security clearance for this – or higher – level of se-
curity. The following security level identiﬁers are used to
reference proper security clearances used in Poland, EU
and NATO:
– J – public level, common for security clearance in
Poland, EU and NATO;
– Z – restricted level, references: Polish ‘ZA-
STRZEZONE’, and ‘EU RESTREINT’ or ‘EU RE-
STRICTED’ and ‘NATO RESTRICTED’;
– P-PL – conﬁdential level, references Polish
‘POUFNE’ clearance;
– P-EU – conﬁdential level, references ‘EU CONFI-
DENTIAL’ or ‘CONFIDENTIEL UE’ security clear-
ance;
– P-NA – conﬁdential level, references ‘NATO CONFI-
DENTIAL’ security clearance;
– T-PL – secret level, references Polish ‘TAJNE’ clear-
ance;
– T-EU – secret level, references ‘SECRET UE’ or ‘EU
SECRET’ clearance;
– T-NA – secret level, references ‘NATO SECRET’
clearance;
– S-PL – top secret level, references Polish ‘SCISLE
TAJNE’ clearance;
– S-EU – top secret level, references European ‘EU
TOP SECRET’ or ‘TRES SECRET UE’ clearance;
– S-NA – top secret level, references ‘NATO COSMIC
TOP SECRET’ clearance.
4.2. User Roles
The security model allows for grouping of the entities re-
lated to users in three roles. Role B.ide of the security
model contains information about all system roles that can
be assigned to users, and is deﬁned as follows:
B.ide(?rol) in V , (1)
where:
rol – may take all deﬁned values.
It is very important in the context of real system operations.
Taking into account that a user can be assigned to diﬀerent
roles, identifying a particular one is done by user ‘Identity’
(denoted as ide in role names). The Identity is deﬁned as
a combination of user and assigned role, and typically cor-
responds to an account in the system – a user may have
more than one account and change roles by switching be-
tween them. From the security point of view, assigning to
the same user AUDIT role and any other is forbidden. Next
two roles, deﬁned as:
B.ide dom rig(?rol,?dom,?rig) in V (2)
and
B.ide dom lev(?rol,?dom,?lev) in V , (3)
where:
rol – may take values from set {ADMIN,USER,AUDIT},
dom – may take all deﬁned domains,
rig – may take all deﬁned values {R,RW},
lev – may take all deﬁned values {J, Z, P-PL, P-EU,
{P-NA, T-PL, T-EU, T-NA, S-PL, S-EU S-NA},
are holding information about an access of user identities
to functional domains. Role (2) determines the type of an
access to domain resources and role (3) deﬁnes restriction
on the highest sensitivity level of resources which a given
identity is allowed to access. User identity can only access
those resources with sensitivity level not exceeding clear-
ance.
4.3. Virtual Machine O-Sets
The security model allows to group objects related to virtual
machines in two ways. The ﬁrst one (4) deﬁnes membership
of a virtual machine to resources of a particular functional
domain. Sensitivity level of data located on a virtual ma-
chine is an attribute of an object representing the virtual
machine. The assignment is performed with a speciﬁc se-
curity level which may not diﬀer from the sensitivity level
assigned to the virtual machine itself.
The second one (5) describes a system role which a user
has to be assigned to gain access to a particular virtual
machine.
B.mv dom(?dom,?lev) in V (4)
where:
dom – may take all deﬁned domains,
lev – may take all deﬁned values.
B.mv rol(?rol) in V (5)
where:
rol – may take values from set {ADMIN,USER,AUDIT}.
4.4. Shared Storage Area O-Sets
Similarly as for virtual machines, the security model al-
lows two groupings of objects related to shared storage
areas. The ﬁrst one (6) deﬁnes functional domain with
a particular sensitivity level that has the shared storage area
in its resources. The second one (7), aside from deﬁning
a system role a particular user has to be granted with,
deﬁnes the type of access. There is no possibility to as-
sign shared storage area as a resource designed for users
in USER system role.
B.ss dom(?dom,?lev) in V (6)
where:
dom – may take all deﬁned domains,
lev – may take all deﬁned values.
B.ss rol(?rol) in V (7)
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where:
rol – role – may take values from set {ADMIN,AUDIT},
rig – rig – may take all deﬁned values.
4.5. Main Role
The most important role (8) of the security model can pro-
vide information about speciﬁc time when user is allowed
to access a particular resource, based on user credentials
and deductive system.
B.main(?rol,?dom,?rig,?lev) in V (8)
where:
rol – may take values from set {ADMIN,USER,AUDIT},
dom – may take all deﬁned domains,
right – may take all deﬁned values,
lev – may take all deﬁned values.
Fig. 2. Visualization of user access control model.
5. Security Model – Credentials
A security model based on the RT2+ language featuring
time validity of credentials is presented in Fig. 2. It is
composed of roles and o-sets, as deﬁned in the previous
section. Furthermore, it presents all possible credentials
the system is able to process. Two types of credentials
were distinguished: credentials created by an Information
Security Oﬃcer, and credentials obtained from the deduc-
tive system process.
The ﬁrst type of credentials includes:
– a user role attribution, creating a user identity (9);
– an identity access type to resources of a particular
functional domain (10);
– an identity access to resources of a functional domain
with particular sensitivity level (11);
– a virtual machine inclusion as a resource of a partic-
ular domain with speciﬁc sensitivity level (13);
– a virtual machine attribution to users holding speciﬁc
system role (14);
– a shared storage area inclusion as a resource of a par-
ticular domain with speciﬁc sensitivity level (16);
– a shared storage area attribution to users holding spe-
ciﬁc system role and type of access (17).
The second type of credentials include:
– a type of access allowed to resources of a domain
with particular sensitivity level for a user holding
speciﬁc role (12);
– a virtual machine inclusion as a resource of a domain
with a particular sensitivity level, with access type
available for a user holding a certain role (15);
– a shared storage area inclusion as a resource of a do-
main with a particular sensitivity level, with speciﬁc
access type available for a user holding a certain
role (18).
5.1. User Credentials
B.ide(rol = X) in V
←−
B.USER(u id = I) in v
(9)
where:
X – role value which is assigned,
I – value of user unique identiﬁer,
v – base time validity of credential,
V – active time validity of credential.
B.ide dom rig(rol = X ,dom = Y,rig = Z) in V
←−
B.ide(rol = X)
∩
B.USER(u id = I) in vide∩ v
(10)
where:
X – role value which is assigned,
Y – domain value which is assigned,
Z – access type value which is assigned,
I – value of user unique identiﬁer,
vide – active time validity of component credential (9),
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v – base time validity of credential,
V – active time validity of credential.
B.ide dom lev(rol = X ,dom = Y, lev = W ) in V
←−
B.ide(rol = X)
∩
B.USER(u id = I,u lev = L : W ∈ L)
in vide∩ vW L∩ v
(11)
where:
X – role value which is assigned,
Y – domain value which is assigned,
W – sensitivity level which is assigned,
L – set of all security levels accessible to
a particular user,
vide – active time validity of component credential (9),
vWL – time validity of user sensitivity level,
v – base time validity of credential,
V – active time validity of credential.
B.main(role = X ,dom =?Y,rig =?Z, lev = W )
in V
←−
B.ide dom rig(role = X ,dom =?Y,rig =?Z)
∩
B.ide dom lev(role = X ,dom =?Y, lev = W )
in vrig∩ vlev
(12)
where:
X – role value which is assigned,
Y – set of domain values which are assigned,
Z – set of access type values which are assigned,
W – security level value which is assigned,
vrig – active time validity of component credential (10),
vlev – active time validity of component credential (11),
V – active time validity of credential,
5.2. Virtual Machine Credentials
B.mv dom(dom = Y, lev = W )in V
←−
B.MV (mv id = M,mv lev = W ) in vmv∩ v
(13)
where:
Y – domain value which is assigned,
W – security level value which is assigned,
M – value of virtual machine unique identiﬁer,
vmv– time validity of virtual machine,
v – base time validity of credential,
V – active time validity of credential.
B.mv rol(role = X)
in V
←−
B.MV (mv id = M) in vmv ∩ v
(14)
where:
X – role value which is assigned,
M – value of virtual machine unique identiﬁer,
vmv– time validity of virtual machine,
v – base time validity of credential,
V – active time validity of credential.
B.main(role =?X ,dom =?Y,rig =′ RW ′, lev = W )
in V
←−
B.mv dom(dom =?Y, lev = W )
∩
B.mv rol(role =?X)
in vdom∩ vrol
(15)
where:
X – set of role values which are assigned,
Y – set of domain values which are assigned,
W – security level value which is assigned,
vdom – active time validity of component credential (13),
vrol – active time validity of component credential (14),
V – active time validity of credential.
5.3. Shared Storage Area Credentials
B.ss dom(dom = Y, lev = W ) in V
←−
B.SS(ss id = S,ss lev = W ) in vss∩ v
(16)
where:
Y – domain value which is assigned,
W – security level value which is assigned,
S – value of shared storage area unique identiﬁer,
vss – time validity of shared storage area,
v – base time validity of credential,
V – active time validity of credential.
B.ss rol(role = X ,rig = Z)
in V
←−
B.SS(ss id = S) in vss∩ v
(17)
where:
X – role value which is assigned,
Z – access type value which is assigned,
S – value of shared storage area unique identiﬁer,
vss – time validity of shared storage area,
v – base time validity of credential,
V – active time validity of credential.
B.main(role =?X ,dom =?Y,rig =?Z, lev = W )
in V
←−
B.ss dom(dom =?Y, lev = W )
∩
B.ss rol(role =?X ,rig =?Z)
in vdom∩ vrol
(18)
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where:
X – set of role values which are assigned,
Y – set of domain values which are assigned,
Z – set of access type values which are assigned,
W – security level value which is assigned,
vdom – active time validity of component credential (16),
vrol – active time validity of component credential (17),
V – active time validity of credential.
6. Prototype
The software implementing the adopted user access con-
trol model can be divided in two parts: server and client
side. The architecture of the software divided into func-
tional modules is presented in Fig. 3. The server part of
Fig. 3. Architecture of prototype solution.
the software is responsible for handling client requests ac-
cording to adopted security model, and it is divided into
three modules:
• The Core – responsible for handling communication
with clients and other server modules.
• The Credential Database – provides functionality of
knowledge base about possible actions of the SSP
system users.
• The Guard – responsible for translating existing cre-
dentials located in the knowledge base into SELinux
rules, eﬀectively granting actual access to resources
for running applications to users of the secure work-
station.
The client part is implemented as a set of dedicated libraries
used by all applications, requiring communication with the
security model provider.
6.1. Server – Core Module
The Core module is responsible for communication with
client applications and validation of incoming requests for
access and modiﬁcation of user access rights to resources.
Its purpose is also to conﬁrm a connecting users right to ac-
cess, and to modify data located in the Credential Database.
It coordinates cooperation between the rest of the server
side modules implementing the access control model: the
Guard and the Credential Database. It was implemented
in C++ language using the functionality of an XML-RPC
server library.
6.2. Server – Guard Module
The Guard Module is responsible for implementing rules
of granting access to resources for applications and users of
the secure workstation. The rules are derived from creden-
tials located in the credential database and implemented
with functionality of SELinux. The temporal validity of
credentials allows the Guard module to use Linux cron
daemon for issuing and revoking access rights at speciﬁc
points of time. The SELinux policy used by SSP is based
on a modiﬁed and extended Multi Level Security (MLS)
policy.
6.3. Server – Credential Database Module
The Credential Database module represents the adopted se-
curity model. It provides the functionality of a knowledge
base of allowed actions in the SSP system performed by
the users. It consists of two elements: API and a database.
Communication is implemented via an API implemented in
C++. Database used in the system is PostgreSQL. Access
to information in the database is restricted by the control
mechanism available in PostgreSQL, based on the model
Role Base Access Control (RBAC). Requests coming from
diﬀerent versions of the library, prepared for speciﬁc ap-
plications are handled by the Core Module on a separate
restricted connection.
6.4. Client – Libraries
The client part of the software is composed from sev-
eral versions of libraries designed for applications requiring
communication with the Core Module of the server. The li-
braries provide interface for reading and modifying creden-
tials in the Credential Database. The functionality shared
by the libraries corresponds to the API of the Credential
Database module. The libraries were implemented in C++
with the same XML-RPC library as the Core Module. Keys
required for digital signing of messages are obtained from
the key database protected by the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM). The set of shared functions of a particular library
corresponds to the actual purpose of the library. There are
ﬁve versions of the library:
• Basic version – intended for the application used to
login, allows validating the logged-in user role.
• User version – intended for applications with active
USER role. It only provides ability to check which
resources are accessible by the logged-in user.
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• Admin version – intended for applications dedi-
cated for administrators of virtual machines. It al-
lows checking which resources are accessible by the
logged-in user and obtaining information required for
correct conﬁguration of the system, e.g., which users
have access to the virtual machine.
• Spec version – intended for Information Security Of-
ﬁcers. It allows for unrestricted reading and modiﬁ-
cation of data in the Credential Database.
• Audit version – intended for Chief Audit Executives,
it allows for unrestricted read-only access to data in
the Credential Database and has access to history of
changes.
7. Conclusion
The article presents a security model of user access con-
trol to virtual machines, which complies with functional
requirements of the “Special workstation for special appli-
cations” project. Additionally, it includes new functionality,
like introduction of a new SSP user role – Administrator
of virtual machines or adding shared storage area as a sep-
arate resource with controlled access. A presentation of
a fully operational prototype software, implementing pre-
sented security model underlines the model’s usability in
real applications. The paper presents the access control
module’s architecture and a short description of all deﬁned
modules.
The Guard module is of particular interest, as it shows
how complex access models can be mapped in a practical
way into simple rules for the well known SELinux solu-
tion. RT -family languages can be even more powerful and
complex (see, e.g., RT T+ ), and they are very well suited for
large, distributed systems with many independent centers
of authority providing users with credentials, with complex
trust relations between them. The presented architecture is
adaptable to this setting, showing that local security mech-
anisms, such as SELinux, are still applicable in such dis-
tributed systems. The necessary approach is to infer simple
access rights from the RT credentials. These rights can
be applied in an automatic way, even taking into account
limited periods of validity of credentials.
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